The equity method was used as an early form of consolidation for all subsidiaries in the UK and for certain subsidiaries in the US. Another use of the method in some countries, even in the era of full consolidation, has been in the financial statements of legal entities. This seems to result from seeing the equity method as a technique for valuation or as an aid in the preparation of consolidated statements rather than as a method of consolidation. The method has also been used as a substitute for consolidation for excluded subsidiaries or for controlled companies not included in the definition of subsidiaries. Later, the equity method was introduced for joint ventures and then for other forms of "strategic alliance", but the latter bring definitional problems, which have led to a consensus around an arbitrary threshold of 20 per cent of voting rights. This paper traces these developments across time and space, and criticises several of the past and present applications of the equity method. The paper also examines the development of the terms "equity method" and "associated company".
Introduction
Across time and across countries, the equity method has been used for different types of investees, and it has also been used in both unconsolidated and consolidated statements. The present international consensus about its use in consolidated statements for certain non-subsidiary investees is hard to defend on the basis of extant accounting conceptual frameworks or of legal concepts. The consensus about the threshold (20 per cent shareholding) connected to the use of the equity method seems to have arisen by accident. The spread of the equity method is another example of the international transfer of accounting technology, as outlined by Parker (1989) for double-entry bookkeeping and the true and fair view requirement (see also Nobes (1993) for the spread of the latter in Europe).
There are several forms of the equity method (e.g. see Ma et al., 1991, p.188) , but the common feature is the inclusion in the investor's income statement of the appropriate proportion of the investee's earnings rather than merely the dividends flowing to the investor or, at the other extreme, rather than the investee's detailed revenues and expenses. In the investor's balance sheet, there is also "one-line consolidation" of the net assets of the investee rather than merely the cost of the investment and rather than line-by-line consolidation of assets and liabilities. As will be clear to users of American English, the term "equity method" implies a measurement at the investor's proportion of equity, which is equal to net assets. This paper does not deal with the technical details of the equity method except when there are underlying theoretical issues of relevance to the paper's theme.
The paper begins by charting the use of the equity method early in the twentieth century as a form of consolidation before full consolidation had developed (called "proto-consolidation", below).
Its use in parent company statements (pseudo-consolidation) is also a long established treatment of subsidiaries. Another early use was in consolidated statements for excluded subsidiaries (substituteconsolidation). The first three sections below deal with these uses relating to subsidiaries.
In the 1960s, the equity method begins to be recommended for investments in certain nonsubsidiaries: as a form of pseudo-consolidation in investor statements and as a form of semiconsolidation in consolidated statements. It is possible to see pseudo-consolidation and semi-consolidation as techniques of valuation rather than of consolidation. For all these uses, there has been opposition, concentrated in a few countries. This paper pieces together the above history, analyses the reasons for the rise of the equity method and assesses the strength of the criticisms. The threshold for the use of the equity method is also examined. One conclusion is that the forces of accounting harmonisation may have overcome logic and law, and that the equity method is inappropriate for most, if not all, of its present uses. The paper also summarises previous academic research and looks at the development of the terms used in the context of the equity method in various countries.
Proto-consolidation
In the UK, the earliest use of the equity method appears to be for the purposes of including subsidiaries in the financial statements of investors as an alternative to consolidation. This method was more common than full consolidation in the 1910s and was still used in the 1920s (Edwards and Webb, 1984 , Table 1 ). On the whole, the equity method was superseded, in the 1930s, by full consolidation or no consolidation; predominantly the latter (Bircher, 1988, p.7) . Another approach was to treat subsidiaries as though they were branches of the parent. This was still practised in the 1930s in such companies as Unilever (Hodgkins, 1979, p.45) . Only with the Companies Act 1947 did "branching" finally disappear. Walker (1978, pp. 99 and 117) suggests that the equity method became less popular because it involved recognising unrealised profit, which was seen as unconservative after the Royal Mail case.
However, Edwards and Webb (1984, p.40) point out that the equity method is more conservative in the sense that it does not ignore losses of subsidiaries as the cost-based method can. As another part of the explanation, they note that the Greene Committee on law reform and the Companies Act 1928 provided no support for the equity method. The Act required holding companies to show shares in subsidiaries, which would not be shown naturally by the equity method. Counsel's opinion i suggested that the balance sheet of the legal entity should be the one filed and presented to the shareholders.
In the US, a more full-blooded approach to consolidation was taken at the beginning of the century, without much need for partial steps such as the equity method. This seems to be due to fewer legal problems in the US and less conservatism of practice (Edwards and Webb, 1984, pp.41-47; Walker, 1978, Section III) . Nevertheless, the equity method was used in parent company statements for certain subsidiaries. For example, Kester (1918, p.261 ) distinguished between parents which had "substantially full ownership" of subsidiary companies and cases where "ownership is not complete but still controlling". For the latter, the equity method in parent statements was seen as a reasonable alternative to the preparation of consolidated statements.
Pseudo-consolidation
The early use of the equity method for subsidiaries in the financial statements of holding companies before the full development of consolidation is considered above under "Protoconsolidation". However, its use has continued in parent statements in some jurisdictions despite inclusion of the subsidiaries in consolidated statements. In the US, a long line of textbooks describe and recommend the use of the equity method in this context. Until the 1960s, there was little promulgated GAAP ii in this area, so textbooks and monographs provided some authoritative support for GAAP.
As noted above, Kester (1918) recommended use of the method in parent statements early on for certain purposes, but was still recommending it in his 1933 edition and its 1945 re-print (pp.194-5), when consolidated statements had become fully developed. Perhaps because of the comparative lack of legal restraints, Kester (1918, p.262) had no qualms about the resulting profit, suggesting that "the profit taken onto the books of the holding company by the above method is a real, not a book, profit", given that the parent controls the subsidiary's dividend policy. A similar view was taken by Finney (1922, p.42) for the investment account in the holding company's books, even though there would also be a consolidated balance sheet. Moonitz (1944, p.49 ) also advocated the use of the equity method in the parent's books for several reasons:
(i) The cost method makes sense when there is uncertainty but that does not apply to subsidiaries (p.48) over which there is full control of dividend policy (p.49).
(ii) The status of the investments varies with the fortunes of the investees not with the movements of cash (p.49). Income accrues as the investments increase in value. Income accrues to the parent when it accrues to the subsidiary (p.52).
(iii) The validity of the subsidiary's profit calculation is as well established as the parent's (p.49).
(iv) Because companies plough back part of their profits, the cost rule will probably understate parent income in prosperous periods (p.53).
Incidentally, Carman (1932, p.103) and Dickerson and Weldon Jones (1933, p.200 ) also propose the method for the treatment of subsidiaries in the investment account of the parent. However, they see it as a useful arithmetic device for preparing consolidated balance sheets when there are several layers of subsidiaries. They seem to regard the resulting balance sheet of the parent as not important in its own right, so that they should not be seen as proposers of pseudo-consolidation.
The contrary point of view to that of Kester and Moonitz is argued by Kohler (1938) who suggests that "no practical benefits are derived from accruing profit and loss of subsidiaries on the books of the controlling company". This is strongly supported by Paton (1951) who specifically opposes Moonitz' arguments:
He is recommending, in effect, that the parent company keep its own accounts from the consolidated point of view, and were his recommendation adopted there would be little excuse left for preparing consolidated statements. (p.46)
Despite this disagreement, it is clear that the method was acceptable where it really mattered. Kester (1945, p.211-2) wrote that:
The Securities and Exchange Commission considers the equity of a holding company in subsidiary profits and losses sufficiently important to require disclosure …. if such equities are not taken up on the books of the holding company. Finney (1946) illustrates the use of the equity method and calls it the "economic basis" of parent company accounting, but notes that it does not conform "strictly to the legal realities" (p.299). As a compromise, Finney recommends the equity method with the undistributable earnings shown separately in shareholders' equity (p.301).
When GAAP was promulgated in 1971 by APB Opinion 18 (para. 14), the equity method was required in parent statements. Although the requirement was subsequently removed by SFAS 94 (of 1987, para. 15) , there is no replacement instruction, so the equity method can still be used in parent statements although these are not generally required to be filed.
There was no equivalent discussion, let alone advocacy, of the equity method for parent statements in the UK in the days before accounting standards, presumably for the legal reasons noted earlier. For example, Cropper's Accounting (Cropper et al., 1932, p.316) recommends that subsidiaries should be accounted for either at cost with attached statements or by consolidation. Similar recommendations come from Garnsey (1923 and 1931, chapter VI) ; and others are silent on the issue (e.g. Pixley, 1910; Dicksee, 1927; Dicksee, 1932; Castle and Grant, 1970; Bogie, 1949; Bogie, 1959) . Subsequently, the method was prohibited in the UK by accounting standard.
iii It is also not allowed for this purpose in Australia iv (AASB 1016) or in Japan (Commercial Code).
However, in the Netherlands, subsidiaries (and joint ventures and associates; see later) are held by the equity method in the unconsolidated financial statements of the investor (Art. 389 (1-3)
Book 2, Title 9 of the Civil Code; Dijksma and Hoogendoorn, 1993, p.132) . This generally enables the equity of the parent to be equal to that of the group. The equity accounted share of profit (in excess of dividends) is, under certain conditions, v shown as undistributable reserves (Art. 389 (4)). In order to allow such practices, an option was written into the EC Fourth Directive (Article 59, as amended by
Article 45 of the Seventh Directive). Consequently, the Netherlands and some other member states have included legal permission for this practice. For example, it is allowed and common in Denmark (Christiansen and Elling, 1993, p.136) , where the practice began in the 1970s (before the Directive). It is also allowed in France (Art. L340-4, Law of 3.1.1985) and in Italy (Civil Code, Art. 2426(4)), but is seldom used. Such permission is not granted in law in the UK or in Germany, where equity accounting is restricted to consolidated statements. Given this international difference, it is not surprising that IAS 27 (para. 29) allows but does not require equity accounting for subsidiaries in an investor's financial statements.
This use of the equity method in investor financial statements could be seen as an example of attempts by accountants to express commercial substance over legal form. Since an investor could usually obtain its share of profits in a subsidiary merely by requesting them, to recognise only dividends might seem like a legal nicety. A clue to another rationale for the use of equity accounting in investor statements can be found in the Dutch term for the method: "intrinsieke waarde" (intrinsic value). That is, this may be seen as a method of valuation rather than as a method of consolidation.
Further, the consolidated statements are seen in Dutch law (Art. 406) as a note to the legal entity's statements, which raises an expectation of consistency of valuation, which is also encouraged by the Seventh Directive (Art. 292 (a)). These rationales are examined later. (Williams, 1996, p.6.05) .
Substitute-consolidation
One important piece of context is that the US definition of a subsidiary seems to be based in practice on ownership of a majority of voting shares rather than on de facto control. Although ARB 51 refers to "controlling financial interest", the usual condition for this is said to be a majority voting interest, and no other examples are given (paragraphs 1 and 2). This is reinforced by the title of SFAS 94: Consolidation of All Majority Owned Subsidiaries. As a result, certain vi controlled investees are not seen as entities to be consolidated. Here, the use of the equity method seems a useful fall-back position.
In Australia, the matter of equity accounting was first officially raised by the accountancy bodies in 1970 in the context of the de-consolidation of loss-making subsidiaries (Zeff, 1973, p.39) .
The equity method is not now used as a substitute for consolidation, because no exclusions from consolidation are allowed vii (AASB 1024). Its use for other purposes in Australia is examined later.
In the UK, SSAP 14 (of 1978) was the earliest requirement for the use of the equity method for subsidiaries excluded from consolidation for reasons of dissimilarity or lack of effective control (paras. 23 and 24 
Semi-consolidation
So far, there has been concentration on three types of use of the equity method for the treatment of subsidiaries, as summarised in the first column of Table 1 . Another use of the equity method is in consolidated statements (and sometimes in investor statements) for certain investees other than subsidiaries. Here the rationale for the equity method as a form of semi-consolidation or of valuation is less clear than above, as will be explored in a later section, after a discussion of some definitional points and an outline of international practice. Committee (ASSC) xi was on the subject of equity accounting, for reasons explored below. It defined an associated company as a joint venture or a company in which there is a substantial interest "(i.e. not less than approximately 20 per cent of the equity voting rights)" (para. 6).
Commenting on the development of the UK standard, Leach (1981, p.6) states that "the existence of consortium companies, controlled by no single corporate body, was very much in point"
and that the definition "emerged as the concept of partnership, recognition of substantial interest … and ability to exercise substantial influence".
The US statement of 1971 on the equity method referred to "joint ventures and certain other investments in common stock" (APB Opinion 18, para. 1). Thus, there are two categories in the UK and US statements, but joint ventures come first, and the others are to be treated in the same way.
In some other jurisdictions, a clear separation of joint ventures from associates is made. Such is the case for France, as examined below. It leads to the possibility or the requirement that joint ventures and associates are treated differently. The rest of this section considers the use of the equity method for associates in consolidated and investor statements. In the following two sections, more detail is added to the above outline of the definition of an associate, and the special treatments for joint ventures are considered.
Recommendations and requirements for consolidated statements
This sub-section looks at the treatment of associates in consolidated financial statements. It is followed by a note on treatments in investor statements. The requirement to use the equity method for associates (defined then as including joint ventures) in consolidated statements can be found in the UK's SSAP 1 (of January 1971). This followed "extensive developments" in the 1960s of holdings in associates (Shaw, 1973, p.176 ) and a brief period of experimentation with the method by some British companies (Accountancy, 1970) . Tweedie (1981, p.171) reports that the ASSC stated that only nine out of a survey of 300 major companies for 1968/69 went beyond accounting for dividends received.
Incidentally, Tweedie suggests that the equity method was therefore "not a subject of great controversy" (p.171) and that it was chosen as the ASSC's first topic partly because the ASSC had inherited work-in-progress for a draft Recommendation of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. By contrast, the first chairman of the ASSC suggested that the topic was "a highly controversial one", chosen because of varied practice (Leach, 1981, p.6) . The controversial aspect is backed up by an editorial in The Accountant (1970) and, in retrospect, by Sharp (1971) . Perhaps these views are reconcilable by noting that the subject was not controversial before ED 1 but that the ASSC's proposal caused a controversy.
Similar US requirements on equity accounting date from very slightly later: APB Opinion 18 of March 1971. In some other countries, recommendations can be found in the 1960s. In France, a ministerial decree of 20 March 1968 (Beeny, 1976, p.147) referred to methods used in group accounts, including full consolidation (intégration globale), proportional consolidation (intégration proportionnelle) and equity accounting (mise en équivalence). The equity method was recommended for companies in which the investee held more than 33 1 / 3 per cent of the equity and which were neither subsidiaries nor joint ventures. There was further official encouragement from the Conseil National de la Comptabilité (CNC, 1973) .
In the Netherlands, the non-governmental xii Hamburger Report of 1962 recommended a version of the equity method ("intrinsic value", see above) for "participations" (deelnemingen), which are long-term significant holdings where the business of the investor and investee are similar (Zeff et al., 1992, p.135) . This would include joint ventures. The governmental Verdam Commission reported in 1964, recommending particular disclosures (although no particular accounting method) for such investments, defined as holdings of 25 per cent or more (Zeff et al., 1992, p.154) . The first exposure draft of the Tripartiete Overleg xiii in 1971, following soon after UK and US drafts, also preferred a version of the equity method for participations (Zeff et al., 1992, p.207 ).
This growing international consensus led to the inclusion in the EC Seventh Directive (drafts of 1976 and 1978, and Article 33 of the final version of 1983) of a requirement for equity accounting for associates in consolidated statements. The requirement also covers joint ventures unless proportionally consolidated (see later). Some European countries had held out against the equity method until they were overwhelmed by the Seventh Directive. For example, in Germany, the concept of the group in the 1965 Aktiengesetz was based on uniform direction (einheitliche Leitung), which survives as an optional basis for the definition of a subsidiary in the Seventh Directive (Art. 1 (2)). On this conceptual basis, since associates are not managed on a unified basis with the investor (because they are not controlled) and so they are not group companies, they had to be accounted for on a cost basis. Although German influence was clear on many issues in the first draft of the Seventh Directive, the Germans had little support on this point and the equity method for associates was proposed as compulsory from the beginning (Diggle and Nobes, 1994, p.324) .
In Sweden, the equity method was regarded with suspicion from a legal standpoint in the early 1980s. The doubt concerned whether the equity method was a legally acceptable valuation method.
xiv
A few large groups used it in consolidated statements but most did not (Cooke, 1988, p.62) . Legal doubts were partially resolved by considering the equity method as a form of consolidation rather than as a valuation method. The equity method was proposed for consolidated statements by the then standard-setting body (FAR) in 1986 (Heurlin and Peterssohn, 1995, p.1997) Outside of Europe, the most sceptical country has been Australia, where there were in the 1980s abuses of the equity method. For example, some effectively controlled entities were equityaccounted instead of being consolidated, and some investees not subject to significant influence were equity-accounted (Ma et al., 1991, pp.204-8 ). An enforcement agency sought legal counsel's opinion on the legality of the equity method under the then Companies Law. Counsel advised that there was a legal impediment (Eddey, 1995, p.303; Vallely et al., 1997, p.17) . Consequently, the standard setters limited the use of the equity method to disclosures based on it (Ma et al., 1991, p.191) , and several proposals for use of the equity method in financial statements did not turn into accounting standards (Gordon and Morris, 1996) . Some Australian groups showed an extra column in their consolidated financial statements on an equity accounted basis (Deegan et al., 1994) .
Just as the legal and conceptual doubts of Germany and Sweden seem to have been swept aside by majority international practice rather than by clear arguments, even Australia amended AASB 1016 in 1998 to require equity accounting, following the removal of the legal impediment and a commitment to harmonisation with IASC standards (Peirson and McBride, 1997) . To avoid a conflict with the Australian conceptual framework and consolidation standard, equity accounting is said to be a valuation method rather than a consolidation technique (Miller and Leo, 1998) . This is up-side down compared to the reasoning in Sweden (noted above), although it fits the Dutch view.
Associates in investor statements
In most countries examined here, associates (like subsidiaries) are valued at cost in investor financial statements. However, in those few countries where pseudo-consolidation (or valuation) is used for subsidiaries in an investor's statements, it is generally extended to associates and joint ventures. Otherwise, the objective of making the group equity equal to the investors equity is not achieved.
For example, in Denmark and the Netherlands, the equity method is used in the parent's statements for associates and joint ventures. This appeared to be in conformity with the Fourth Directive, where Article 59 allowed such treatment for an undefined category of "affiliated undertakings"; and this has been clarified by an amendment in Article 45 of the Seventh Directive which refers to significantly influenced undertakings. In the US, the equity method was also originally required in parent statements for those investments that were equity accounted in consolidated statements (APB Opinion 18, para.17). It is presumably now allowed despite the amendments to SFAS 94 (see earlier section on pseudo-consolidation). It is also allowed by IAS 28 (paragraph 12). In the same way as for subsidiaries, the method is allowed for associates in France and Italy (but not used), and is not allowed in the UK or Germany.
More on the definition of an associate
UK and US rules (SSAP 1 and APB Opinion 18, both of 1971) basically defined associates xv as those over which the investor exercises significant influence on operating and financial policies (SSAP 1, para. 13; APB Opinion 18, para. 17). This is the definition followed by the EC Seventh Directive of 1983 (Article 33 (1) ), and therefore found in many European national laws.
However, this is a much vaguer concept (and more difficult to audit) than even the concept of "control" which is the basis of the definition of a subsidiary in many jurisdictions. Consequently, guidance is needed if standardised practice is to result. Part of the guidance comes in the form of a numerical threshold of the percentage of shares (or voting shares) to be held. In some jurisdictions, the threshold appears to be of a mechanical nature; in others it is hedged around with rebuttable presumptions. This point will be considered after the size of the threshold has been examined. The emergence of an internationally agreed threshold of 20 per cent of voting shares seems to have been accidental, as will now be charted.
There is a long history of separately identifying non-subsidiary investments above a certain size of holding. For example, in the UK, the Companies Act 1947 xvi designated certain holdings as "trade investments". According to Shaw (1973, p.175) , these:
may be taken to be investments made to cement a trading relationship or for specific purposes associated with the trade of the investing company.
The Companies Act 1967 (s.4) went further and required a number of non-financial disclosures where an individual investor held more than 10 per cent of equity xvii in an investee. Also, the London Stock Exchange Listing Agreement required, at least from the first "Yellow Book" of 1966, disclosures about so called "associated companies", defined originally as those in which the investing group held more than a certain threshold level of equity. Shaw (1973, p.176) suggests that this is a significant precedent for the ASSC's work because of the use of the term "associated company" and the reference to total group holdings rather than to investor holdings. These two points distinguish the Stock Exchange's requirement from previous company law or tax law. Shaw (1973, p.176 ) also states that the Listing Agreement uses a 20% threshold, which would seem to clinch the argument about the source of the definition. However, the Yellow Books of June 1966 and of April 1969 use 25% in their definitions. xviii An amendment to the Yellow Book, to reduce the threshold from 25% to 20% holdings, was published in June 1972, which puts it after SSAP 1, suggesting that the latter influenced the Stock Exchange, rather than the other way round.
In the UK, the ASSC's first exposure draft (ED 1) of June 1970 had already used a threshold of 20 per cent (para. 7). No explanation is given for this level in the exposure draft. xix There are several comments on equity accounting in the accountancy journals xx of the day (Titcomb, 1970; Goch, 1972) , but only one can be found with any explanation of the 20 per cent: MacNair (1970, p.367) notes that, under tax law of the time, a consortium that could share tax losses was one where equity participation was held by five or fewer companies. It was suggested that "common interest"
would be implied where such consortium relief was used. There are no references to the origins of the 20 per cent threshold in the archives xxi of the ASSC or in the current memories of participants xxii in the debates.
In the US, the APB's sub-committee on this subject initially favoured a 10 per cent threshold on the basis of what it called an "economic interest" interpretation. xxiii Some members of the subcommittee xxiv and the SEC staff preferred a 25 per cent threshold on the basis of "presumption of control", particularly over dividend payments. The Board, at its meeting of March 1970, changed its position from favouring 10 per cent to 25 per cent. However, at the July meeting, it was noted xxv that the UK's ED 1 proposed 20 per cent and that international co-ordination would be beneficial (Defliese, 1981, p.110; Journal, 1970, p.12) . It seems that, even in the first year of operations of the UK standard-setter, there was an exchange of exposure drafts with the APB; and in the following year, the APB Chairman was in London for discussions (Accountancy, 1971) . Table 2 summarises the exceptions from the 20% threshold; the last two of which are extant.
As noted above, the numerical threshold is stated baldly in some rules, particularly those flowing from the Seventh Directive. For example, in Germany (HGB §311 (1)) and in Italy (Civil Code, Art. 2359 (3)), the assumption of significant influence rests squarely on the numerical thresholds, and no qualitative indications are given. In other jurisdictions, the rule-makers appear to have attempted to ensure that financial reporting choices rest on something less mechanical. As noted later, the problem then becomes the vagueness of the rationale for equity accounting. Some rule-makers are clear, at least, that an investor should not be able to treat an investee differently from year to year by buying and selling a few shares around the 20 per cent threshold. Consequently, in the US, APB Opinion 18 discusses this in terms of "considerations" (e.g. representation on the board, and the concentration of other shareholdings) and "presumptions" (para. 17).
Despite the US attempt to make the threshold less stark, Comiskey and Mulford (1986) found a high concentration of investments in the 16% to 24% range. Further, affiliates in the 19 to 19.99% range of ownership reported losses far more often than those in the 20 to 20.99% range.
The UK's ED 1 (para. 6) contained the threshold of "approximately 20 per cent". The "approximately" was removed for the original SSAP 1 (para. 6), presumably on the grounds of reducing vagueness. However, the "rebuttable presumption" basis was introduced later (in 1982, para.
14), along US lines. This was strengthened in FRS 9, where there is an extensive discussion of "significant influence" and it is made clear that this overrides the numerical threshold (paras. 4 and 14 -19). Indeed, the 20 per cent is referred to as part of "companies legislation", suggesting that the reference to a mechanical threshold would have been removed but for this. The irony here is that the threshold in the British law was based on the Seventh Directive which was based on the AngloAmerican practice which can be traced to a British exposure draft of 1970.
Joint Ventures
Definition It was noted above that "semi-consolidation" was initially seen in the US and the UK as particularly appropriate for joint ventures, with other associated investees also mentioned. Originally in the UK the category "associate" included the joint venture. However, most jurisdictions now define the terms exclusively, even where the accounting treatment is to be the same.
Early French definitions of the joint venture (including that in a report of the CNC of March 1968) (CNC, 1973; Beeny, 1976, p.147) refer to a "société fermée", i.e. one where no shares are held outside of a group of venturers. For an investee to be a joint venture, the investor would have to hold a "participation", i.e. at least 10 per cent of the shares. Once more, the 10 per cent threshold arises. In APB Opinion 18 (para. 3) the relevant joint venture is "a corporation owned and operated by a small group of businesses … as a separate and specific business or project for the mutual benefit of the members of the group".
The EC Seventh Directive sees joint ventures as separate from associates, partly because different treatments are allowed (see below). The Directive's definition of joint venture (Article 32) rests on "jointly managed". British law (1985 Act, Sch. 4A, para. 19) follows these words but in FRS 9
"jointly controlled" is used, as follows:
An entity in which the reporting entity holds an interest on a long-term basis and is jointly controlled by the reporting entity and one or more other venturers under a contractual arrangement. (para. 4)
A similar interpretation has occurred in France, where the Directive says "dirige, In what follows, joint ventures will be assumed to be entities separate from the venturers. For example, IAS 31 (para. 3) distinguishes between jointly controlled "entities", "operations" and "assets". The latter two categories create few accounting problems because the various assets and liabilities belong to the venturers, so they are included in the financial statements of the venturer (both the individual entity statements and the consolidated).
Treatment of joint ventures
As noted earlier, in cases where equity accounting is used in an investor's unconsolidated financial statements for subsidiaries and associates (e.g. Denmark and the Netherlands), then it is also better reflects the substance and economic reality of a venturer's interest in a jointly controlled entity, that is control over the venturer's share of the future economic benefits. This is despite the fact that the IASC's Framework (para. 49) defines assets in terms of control over the resources not control over the benefits from the resources. It is unclear whether or not a venturer controls its share of the future economic benefits, but it is clear that it does not control the resources.
Otherwise, the investee would be a subsidiary. Consequently, neither the resources nor part of them are assets of the venturer.
The response to the Seventh Directive in France was to require proportional consolidation, which was previous French practice. In most EU member states proportional consolidation is allowed.
However, this is not the case in Greece, nor in Ireland and the UK for corporate joint ventures. It is also not allowed for joint venture entities in Japan (Sawa, 1998) or in Australia (AASB 1006 and 1024).
In some jurisdictions where proportional consolidation is not allowed, there is nevertheless some concern about the potentially misleading nature of equity accounting for joint ventures. For example, a group would not be required to recognise its share of the liabilities of a 50 per cent held joint venture. One way of responding to this is now used in the UK, where FRS 9 requires the use of the "gross equity method" for joint venture entities (paras. 20 -21) . This method, which has a precedent in FASB discussion papers, xxxiii involves extra disclosures on the face of the consolidated financial statements, including the investor's share of the joint venture's turnover, gross assets and gross liabilities.
The reporting entity
This international lack of agreement on the treatment for joint ventures illustrates the need for clearer conceptual frameworks. The EC Seventh Directive has no explicit framework. The US and IASC frameworks do not discuss the boundary of the reporting entity, and therefore have nothing directly to offer on consolidation issues, although the definition of asset seems relevant, as noted above. By contrast, the UK's draft Statement of Principles of 1995 devotes its seventh and last chapter to "the reporting entity". The boundary of the group rests on control, which requires: The ASB concludes that this puts joint venture entities outside the group and therefore that proportional consolidation should not be used.
Rationales for the Equity Method
Although the equity method is now used for various purposes in much of the world, the rationales for this are not well explained. The seven cases in Table 1 are examined here.
In the context of the treatment of subsidiaries in an investor's unconsolidated financial statements, the rationale for proto-consolidation (Case I) has been overtaken by the development of full consolidation. Possible rationales for pseudo-consolidation (Case II) include that the equity method is a form of accruals accounting rather than the cash accounting used by the cost method (Neuhausen, 1982, p.62) . This seems inconsistent with the realisation convention but, given that Case II relates to subsidiaries, one could run a substance over form argument. Several such arguments of US writers were examined earlier. A doubt, which did not concern early US writers, could be raised for foreign investees where there might be uncertainties connected to the transfer of funds and the exchange rate.
A similar rationale is that the equity method is a form of valuation. The link is made in an
Australian exposure draft where equity accounting is seen as:
a method of accounting, on an accrual basis, … thereby ensuring improved reporting on the worth of particular investments to the investor. (ASA/ICAA, 1973, para. 19) This seems to be inconsistent with the historical cost convention used in most countries, though not uniformly in some countries, e.g. Australia and the Netherlands.
For investees other than subsidiaries, pseudo-consolidation (Cases III and IV) seems even less convincing. The substance over form argument no longer works, as the investor does not control the assets of the investee, or its dividend decisions. The profits of the investee (in excess of dividends) are not within the control of the investor. The basis for a threshold at 20% is also unclear, particularly since the "intrinsic value" of all investments changes as profits are made. Further, the method is not a conceptually impressive way of valuing, and "fair value" would now seem more relevant, at least where it can be measured (e.g. IASC, 1997). Nevertheless, a possible defence of the method in the context of the general use of fair values would be that large blocks of shares could not be sold at apparent market value. Of course, a large block of shares does have a fair value, although it may be more difficult to identify.
For the above Cases II to IV, the usefulness of making the parent's income and equity the same as the group's is unclear, unless the parent statements are merely unpublished worksheets.
Turning to consolidated statements, the rationale for substitute-consolidation (Case V) has also been overtaken by events in jurisdictions where all controlled investees must be consolidated. For uncontrolled investees (Cases VI and VII), the equity method could be seen again as a method of valuation, whereupon the above points apply. It could also be seen as a form of semi-consolidation.
However, just as the investor does not control the investee's assets, profits or dividend decisions, neither does the group. A basic question here is: are such investees part of the investor's group? As noted above for joint venture entities, the ASB's answer is that they are clearly not. Elsewhere, the answer should be the same if the scope of the group is either based on control or majority ownership, as is the case in the US (ARB 51, para. 2), the European Union (Seventh Directive, Article 1) or the IASC (IAS 27, para. 6). It seems difficult, then, to support the equity method as semi-consolidation on the basis of substance over form.
However, perhaps a rationale can be built around the idea that, above a certain threshold level of interest, the investor is in some form of special relationship with the investee. This approach, which sees associates and joint ventures as much the same, survived into the UK Discussion Paper (ASB, 1994) which treats them both as "strategic alliances" (para. 2.3) to be accounted for by the equity method. Later, FRS 9 (of 1997) rephrases this as follows:
The investor needs an agreement or understanding, formal or informal, with its associate to provide the basis for its significant influence. An investor exercising significant influence will be directly involved in the operating and financial policies of its associate. Rather than passively awaiting the outcome of its investee's policies, the investor uses its associate as a medium through which it conducts a part of its activities ….. Over time, the associate will generally implement policies that are consistent with the strategy of the investor and avoid implementing policies that are contrary to the investor's interests. (para. 14)
This approach clearly sees the equity method as semi-consolidation, and it rests on joint control of the dividend decision even in those cases where there is not joint control of the individual assets and liabilities. It seems to suit Case VI the best, but might be extended to some associates in Case VII.
Technical Problems Raised by Lack of Framework
Since the concept behind the equity method and the purpose of its use are unclear, it also becomes difficult to resolve technical issues. For example, when an investor makes a profit by selling to an associate which retains the goods (downstream sales), should some or all of the profit be eliminated from the investor's and the consolidated statements?
The profit in the hands of the investor is realised and legally distributable, and therefore should presumably not be eliminated. The same could be said of a profit arising from a sale from a parent to a subsidiary. On consolidation, this latter profit would be eliminated because the subsidiary is part of the group, and the price (and therefore profit) of the sale was controlled by the group. Neither of these points applies to a sale to an associate, which might suggest no elimination, even in consolidated statements.
The Seventh Directive (Article 33 (7)) appears to require elimination but either total or proportional seem to be allowed. In the UK, FRS 9 (para. 31) states that there should be proportional elimination. The IASC has also recently concluded (SIC Interpretation No. 3) that there should be proportional elimination. The problem is that, since the theory supporting the equity method is unclear, the theoretical answer on elimination is also unclear.
Another technical point is the location of the equity accounted elements in profit and loss accounts and cash flow statements. The basic issue is whether the amounts are to be classified as operating or as financial. In the EC Fourth Directive (e.g. Article 23, line 9), the profit from participating interests is shown after operating items and as the first financial item. This allows companies to draw the operating line above or below equity accounted profits. In the UK, for example, SSAP 1 did not specify the treatment, but FRS 9 (para. 27) requires equity accounted operating profits to be shown immediately after group operating profit. For UK cash flow statements, dividends from associates were originally to be shown as returns on investments (FRS 1 of 1991, para. 19), then as operating activities (FRS 1 of 1996, paras. 11 and 14), then as a separate item between returns and operating (FRS 1 revised by para. 61 of FRS 9).
The EC Seventh Directive (Article 33 (6)) could be interpreted as allowing a different position for equity accounted income in consolidated income statements from that required under the Fourth Directive. In France, advantage has been taken of this, so that such amounts are shown after consolidated profit and before minority interests (Plan comptable général, p.11.168). This suggests that such profit is neither operating nor financial.
In the US, APB Opinion 18 (para. 19 (c)) is unclear on the location of equity accounted income. Burnett et al. (1979) found that, for 22 finance subsidiaries excluded from consolidation, there were five different presentations of the equity accounted income in consolidated income statements.
Modern practice still ranges from presentation as "other income" before various operating expenses to presentation after minority interests. xxxiv In US cash flow statements, dividends received from equity accounted companies are generally included in operating activities in cash flow statements (Williams, 1996, 4.23) .
IAS 1 (para. 75, and appendix) shows equity accounted profits after operating and financing items in income statements, whereas IAS 7 (paras. 31 and 37) allows dividends from equity accounted companies to be treated as operating or investing items in cash flow statements.
A third technical issue is the presentation of discontinued operations. There are US, UK and IASC rules in this area. The relevant issue relates to the disposal of some shares in a major subsidiary such that it becomes an associate. Assuming that the subsidiary were large enough to satisfy the size criterion for being a discontinued operation (e.g. FRS 3, para. 4), would the disposal of some shares amount to a discontinuance of the operation by the reporting entity? This issue was a matter for international debate xxxv when IAS 35 was agreed in 1998. Since the reporting entity is the group, it would seem that the group has disposed of the operation, and it no longer consolidates any individual assets, liabilities, revenues or expenses. However, the IASC Board decided (IAS 35, para. 2) that it would be consistent with other equity accounting practices to regard the operation as continuing within the sphere of the group's interests.
What's in a Name?
It is now appropriate to address another issue: the origins of the terms "equity method" and "associated company".
Equity method
"Equity method" is clearly an American coinage, and can be traced back at least to the early 1930s in the context of the arithmetic used for the preparation of consolidated balance sheets (Carman, 1932, p.103; Dickerson and Weldon Jones, 1933, p.200) . The term can also be found later in the context of "pseudo-consolidation" in investor statements. This is the case in Noble, Karrenbrock and Simons (1941, p.581) and in Finney and Miller (1952, pp.343-5) ; although not in the previous edition of the latter book (Finney, 1946, p.297) . Other terms for the equity method in this context were also in use: for example, "book value" (Paton, 1943 (Paton, , p.1073 and Moonitz, 1944, p.51) , "economic basis of accounting" (Finney, 1946, p.297) ; "book value change basis" (Moonitz and Staehling, 1950, p.184) .
In promulgated GAAP, the term is not initially used; that is, it cannot be found in ARB No. The terms are not to be found in the Fourth Directive (where the vague term "affiliated undertakings" includes subsidiaries, and the term "participating interests" includes those not significantly influenced), but "associated undertaking" does appear in the Seventh Directive (Art. 33).
The English origin seems clear enough in other language versions of the Directive; for example, "geassocieerde onderneming" in Dutch, "enterprise associée" in French, "assoziertes Unternehmen"
in German, "impresa associata" in Italian and "sociedad asociada" in Spanish. 
Some Empirical Findings
In addition to the many writings referenced above, there has been some empirical research related to the use of the equity method. Comiskey and Mulford (1985) and Burnett et al. (1979) have already been mentioned. Another US paper is by Ricks and Hughes (1985) who found a positive market reaction to the first publication of US financial statements using the equity method. The reaction was positively correlated with size of equity earnings and degree of previous underestimate by analysts. This suggested that "the equity method provided information concerning affiliate earnings not previously available from other sources" (p.50). Vallely et al. (1997) survey eight studies on equity accounting in Australia. Most of these examine whether management adopts aspects of equity accounting for particular reasons, e.g.
attempting to increase management compensation. Mazay et al. (1993) suggest that the equity method may be useful in controlling management's behaviour where a material proportion of a firm's assets is in the form of investments in associates. Without the equity method, management might be able to manipulate profit by influencing dividend decisions or non-arm's length transactions with investees.
Similarly, lenders cannot reliably value borrowers who have material investments in unlisted associates.
Another Australian paper (Czernkowski and Loftus, 1997) suggests that, in the period 1983 to 1990, the equity method provided useful information, particularly when cost-based information was also available.
Synthesis and Policy Implications
The equity method arose as a form of proto-consolidation for inclusion of subsidiaries (or less than fully owned subsidiaries) in parent's financial statements before the practice of consolidation was fully established. Later, the equity method was seen to be unnecessary in some jurisdictions for parent statements. However, in other jurisdictions, its sporadic or generalised use (pseudo-consolidation) is still found, such that the parent's statements contain technically unrealised profits. This pseudoconsolidation can be seen instead as a method of valuation. The term "equity method" is an American coinage used originally in the context of investor statements. Another formerly widespread use (substitute-consolidation) relates to the treatment in consolidated statements of certain subsidiaries or controlled non-subsidiaries excluded from full consolidation.
These three uses of the equity method for the treatment of subsidiaries (Cases I, II and V of Table 1 ) seem to be unnecessary or unsuitable:
(i) proto-consolidation, because it has been replaced by consolidation;
(ii) pseudo-consolidation in investor's financial statements, because any form of consolidation seems inappropriate or unhelpful and because there are convincing arguments against using the equity method as a valuation method; and (iii) substitute-consolidation, because a control-based concept of the group means that all controlled enterprises should be fully consolidated.
The equity method has also been used for inclusion of joint ventures and associates in investor statements (Cases III and IV: more pseudo-consolidation or valuation) or in consolidated statements (Cases VI and VII: semi-consolidation or valuation). These uses seem to have arisen with little theoretical justification and no prior research into their usefulness. Cases III and IV seem inappropriate for the same reasons as apply to pseudo-consolidation of subsidiaries, and for some extra reasons related to lack of control. This leaves semi-consolidation, which can be divided into two categories:
joint ventures (Case VI) and less formal partnerships and other holdings of 20% or more (Case VII). In the UK and the US, the context for the method originally stressed joint ventures, but other associated enterprises were also included, leading to definitional problems. Terms such as "associated company"
were UK inventions of the 1960s onwards.
The arguments for Case VII seem the weakest, particularly where there is no sense of partnership. The concept of "significant influence" is vague and not easily operationalised; and the 20 per cent threshold is unsupported by argument, having apparently arisen in the UK and been accepted in the US as a compromise. Where an arbitrary threshold has to be invented in order to operationalise an accounting rule, two features generally occur in conjunction. First, there is a lack of convincing theory and, second, management will try to avoid unattractive financial reporting by making arrangements that fall above or below the threshold, as noted earlier.
An analogy to this aspect of equity accounting for associates is the capitalisation of finance leases. The US and UK rules xliv contain, inter alia, a threshold of 90% of fair value. The German tax rules xlv (and therefore accounting practice) also contain numerical thresholds. These various rules enable management to select leases below the thresholds, which the leasing industry is happy to provide. The US and UK thresholds can be seen as an attempt to operationalise the "substantially all of the risks and rewards of ownership of an asset to the lessee" concept (e.g. SSAP 21, para. 15).
However, this has no theoretical basis in any published conceptual framework. When the frameworks' definitions of asset and liability are applied, it becomes clear that all leases meet the definitions, so the arbitrary thresholds are not needed (McGregor, 1996) . The IASC has begun a joint project with UK and Australian standard-setters to move in this direction.
Applying this analogy to equity accounting, the "significant influence" concept is difficult to operate, which is why an arbitrary threshold of 20% arose. However, the concept is not found in the frameworks (except for the UK's draft Statement of Principles). Further, it is clear that an application of the frameworks' definitions suggests that an associate is not part of the group and that its profits (in excess of dividends) are not group profits. This all suggests that equity accounting has little theoretical support. If equity accounting were not allowed, we would not need non-operational concepts or arbitrary thresholds. We would also not need to worry about technical problems such as the treatment of profits made on selling to associates.
Overriding all this must be a consideration of the objectives of financial statements. If one accepts the frameworks' objectives, then the issue becomes largely an empirical matter of the best prediction of future cash flows (subject to reliability). In academic writings, there is some justification for the equity method as an approximate valuation method, as a way of reducing agency problems or as a way of providing more information on earnings. However, more research is needed here.
One conclusion is that standard setters should not perpetuate operationally difficult concepts and arbitrary thresholds or group concepts which seem inconsistent with their frameworks unless they can produce evidence that the prediction of future cash flows is enhanced. One way forward would be to require all investments to be shown at fair value, taking gains and losses to comprehensive income.
xlvi This would replace the equity method with a more honest valuation approach and would remove arbitrary thresholds.
In practice, recent moves towards the use of fair value for investments have deliberately excluded investments in subsidiaries, joint ventures and associates (e.g. SFAS 115, para. 4; and IAS 39, para. 1a) . This leads to such delicious ironies as that, under IAS, a 10% holding in a listed company would be held at fair value in the investor's statements, whereas a 25% holding would generally xlvii be valued at cost. In the group's statements, the 10% holding would again be fair valued, whereas the 25% holding would be equity accounted. If the latter were seen as a valuation method, it would not be a good one.
Most of the above arguments also apply against using the equity method in the final remaining case: for the treatment in consolidated statements of joint ventures (Case VI) and perhaps other "partnerships" (those associates most like joint ventures). Theoretical support has to rest on the idea that the investor exercises long-run control over its share of the profits. Another form of support comes from concern that any alternative to the equity method is worse. For example, full consolidation or proportional consolidation of individual assets of a 20% holding in a joint venture or other partnership would be inconsistent with the frameworks' concept of control. At the other extreme, a cost-based method seems to be misleading as a group presentation of an interest in a 50%-held joint venture.
This last case seems to be the least objectionable use of equity accounting, and could be seen as semi-consolidation rather than valuation. The UK's "gross equity method" addresses some of the disclosure problems caused by the netting off involved in the equity method.
iv Except where there are no consolidated statements.
v The elements for which the parent cannot control the distribution of profits.
vi The SEC has a somewhat broader notion, including special purpose entities. EITF 90-15 also goes somewhat further.
vii "Temporary" exclusions are not allowed; the existence of severe restrictions on ability to control implies that the investee is not a subsidiary.
viii Companies Act 1981; re-enacted as Sch. 4, para. 65(1) to the 1985 Act; then, in 1989, relating to dissimilarity, as Sch. 4.A, para. 18.
ix Reference in Article 14 (1) (on exclusion) is made to Article 33 (on the equity method).
x Ordelheide and Pfaff (1994, p.177) suggest that it is also appropriate for optionally excluded subsidiaries (e.g. limitations on control). xv APB Opinion 18 does not use this term, although it can be found in US literature (e.g. Neuhausen, 1982, p.55) .
xvi Consolidated as paras. 8(1)(a) and 12(1)(g) of Schedule 8 to the 1948 Act.
xvii Or where the book value of the shares was more than 10% of total assets. xviii Schedule VIII, part A, para. 6(c), note (i): 'For the purpose of this Undertaking "associated company" means a company which is not a subsidiary but in which 25% or more of the equity is held by the company or, if the company has subsidiaries, by the group companies collectively (i.e. before excluding any proportion attributable to interests of outside shareholders in the subsidiaries).' xix Reprinted in Accountancy, July 1970, pp.496-8. xx The author has examined contemporary issues of Accountancy, The Accountants Magazine, The Accountant and The Journal of Accountancy. xxiii I am most grateful to Steve Zeff for the information in this paragraph. Professor Zeff writes in a letter to me of July 8, 1996 that he has based the information on minutes of the APB sub-committee and reports of Big Eight firms to partners after meetings of the sub-committee. xxix Paragraph 38 appears to wish to ignore the issue. Paragraph 41, despite its heading, relates to particular unusual joint ventures.
xxx Paragraph 39 requires profit made by selling from an investor to a joint venture (including a joint venture entity) to be eliminated. This is not required under IASs 27 or 28 for an investor selling to a subsidiary or an associate.
xxxi The author has contacted the IASC on this (9 February 1999), and there is informal acceptance of the problem. For example, APB Opinion 18 (para. 17) refers to significant influence over an investee. In practice, the equivalent to "associated undertaking" is an expression such as "equity accounted investee". xlv See Nobes (1997, p.64) .
xlvi "Comprehensive income" is the term now to be found in SFAS 130. In US terms, whether such gains and losses should be shown in "income" or "other comprehensive income" may become a relatively trivial issue as moves are made towards a single income statement.
xlvii Assuming, as in many countries, that equity accounting is not used in investors' statements.
